I examine the conditions for the no-trade theorem to hold in multiperiod consumption settings and show it no longer holds in many reasonable scenarios. In situations where agents have different concerns for intertemporal substitution, information-based trade can be mutually acceptable because it enables agents to readjust their consumption profiles based on future consumption shocks. I show that the existing literature that finds no-trade results in various multiperiod consumption settings crucially depends on specific preference assumptions that lead to risk aversion dominating concerns for intertemporal substitution. The no-trade theorem fails to hold when a wider range of utility functions This paper studies how a firm's growth is affected by the evolution of its external debt financing environment. Asymmetric information about the qualities of projects the firm can undertake makes external financing costly. Collateral can mitigate this problem, but its availability is limited by the size of the firm. As a firm grows, more collateral becomes available, broadening the firm's access to external debt financing channels and lowering its cost of capital. The firm's growth decision is affected by how effective additional collateral can be in lowering its cost of capital and the amount of assets it needs to accumulate to broaden its access to potential lending channels. A small firm may optimally choose to stay small when it is financially constrained and far from the size necessary to have access to formal lending. When the size of a small firm approaches the level needed to have access to formal lending there arises a strong incentive to expand, making the firm locally risk loving. The framework I study also raises some questions about the frequent use of a firm's growth rate as an empirical proxy for firm value. I show that a high growth rate is not necessarily associated with high firm value.
Pessimistic Leverage
In the literature on trading involving leveraged positions when there are heterogeneous beliefs, people take it as granted that it must be the optimists who take leverage to buy risky assets. However, many studies on the recent housing bubble find that the lenders, such as banks and investors in the mortgage loan market, might be the optimists. This paper studies the possibility of the pessimistic agents taking on leverage. Pessimistic leverage is possible because the leverage trading can be viewed as a joint investment in which the lender takes the upper part of the asset payoff while the borrower takes the bottom part. When the optimists are relatively more optimistic about the downside payments, it is optimal for the pessimists to purchase the asset and take leverage. In pessimistic leverage, traders may take leverage even when their cash constraints are not binding, and buying the asset is not profitable.
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